Let us briefly see how a seemingly natural and promising line of approach runs quickly into a dead end. I wish I could say that I stand by everything I said in these papers; on some issues I do of course, but on others my views have changed, rather significantly in a few instances, and I expect them to continue to change and evolve.
I argue that nonreductive physicalism resembles emergentism in certain critical respects, and that, like emergentism, it faces the notorious and, to the nonreductive physicalist, devastating problem of "downward causation.
It bears a resemblance to R.
This procedure, therefore, is in sharp contrast with the procedure in which the inner structure of events is not analyzed and which, as a result, does not associate with each event a unique constitutive property.
In any case, if we allow ourselves conjunctive events of at least this simple sort, we can simplify the preceding formulation of Humean causation: Some of these arguments appear in a more detailed form, and are better defended, elsewhere in this volume Essays 15, 16, and In this section I sketch an analysis of events11 on the basis of which I shall formulate three versions of Humean causation in the next section.
It would seem that ii is more usefully stated thus: This book is dedicated to my wife, Sylvia, who has sustained me and my work all these years with her unconditioned support and affection.
Justin Broackes, Victor Caston, Ernie Sosa, and Jim Van Cleve have given me helpful comments and advice on the two sets of postscripts included in this volume. But this has no tendency to show that we have one event here and not two. The MIT Press, I point out certain peculiar properties of global supervenience, and argue that to the extent that global supervenience fails to imply strong supervenience, it falls short as a relation of dependence strong enough for the statement of a robust physicalist position on the mind-body problem.
Essay 1 "Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event" explores some ontological issues concerning the relata of causal relations within the framework of a broadly Humean "nomic-subsumptive" conception of causation.
It follows that each event falls under exactly one generic event, and that once a particular cause-effect pair is fixed, the generic events that must satisfy the constant conjunction requirement are uniquely fixed. Reprinted by permission of the editor of Philosophical Topics.
If two rifles are fired simultaneously, resulting in two simultaneous deaths, we need a relation of that kind to pair each rifle shot with the death it causes and not with the other. But what do these four relations tell us about the nature of the entities they relate?
In any case, the unsettled state of the formal theory of deductive explanation implies a similar unsettled state for the nomic-implicational approach to Humean causation.
I think that part of the resistance against the account of events just alluded to stems from the feeling that the duality of these events is unacceptable in view of the obvious intimate relationship between the two.
The covering-law model of explanation, as a first approximation, can be formulated thus: But, given a particular causal relation between two individual events, precisely which generic events must be lawfully correlated in order to sustain it?
It is easily seen that our last formulation of Humean causation is also open to the difficulty of parasitic constant conjunctions; however, we omit the details.
I wrote Essay 4 "Concepts of Supervenience" as a general study of the supervenience relation, a project that was begun several years earlier in my "Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables.
Cornell University Press, But spatial contiguity makes best sense when applied not to events but to objects, especially material bodies; intuitively at least, we surely understand what it is for two bodies to be in contact or to overlap.
We should be wary of speaking of "composite events" before a precise characterization of them is on hand.
As a definition it would likely be construed as presupposing an extensional interpretation of attributes whether in the possible-world semantics or in some other schemewhereas I prefer to be silent on this issue here.
The moral of these difficulties for the nomic-implicational model is this: Thus, if [ a, TP] is contiguous with [ b, T"Q], this must be so in virtue of a contiguity relation holding for a, b, T, and T"; and the relevant aspect of the objects a and b is their spatial location at the indicated times.
This, however, requires reconsideration. This is so even though the lawlike correlation between them is completely symmetric. If it is thought that death is a process not an instantaneous event, we could take the termination of the process of death as our example. Reidel, ; and my "Events and Their Descriptions: What sort of structures do we need as relata of causal relations?
In this particular case, what we have in mind is that whenever a metallic object is heated it expands. In this case, the asymmetry of the agency relation, as we shall call it, lies in the causal asymmetry between states or events brought about by the actions: I advance new considerations concerning "disjunctive properties" as nomic properties here I depart from the views defended in Essay 8and draw some unexpected implications concerning the status of the mental and the nature of psychology as a special science.This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book.
The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem.4/5(1). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) [Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa] on killarney10mile.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.
Jaegwon Kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics.1/5(1). free supervenience and mind selected philosophical essays cambridge studies in philosophy PDF Full Ebook best in size MB, supervenience and mind selected philosophical essays cambridge studies in philosophy PDF Full Ebook would available in currently and writen by Krystina Milan.
Add tags for "Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays". Be the first. Jaegwon Kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics.
This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. If you are searched for a book by Jaegwon Kim Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) in pdf format, then you've come to the right site.Download